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None of today’s nine nuclear weapons states achieved their status with-
out the assistance from people, information, equipment and/or sensitive 
technology that came from somewhere else. In a relatively small number 
of cases, transfers from one state to another happened between estab-
lished political allies that shared strategic objectives. However, many of 
these programmes undeniably depended upon stolen knowledge and il-
licitly acquired materials. However much the international community 
wants to forget about this sordid history, the stealing of nuclear secrets 
has provided a regrettable but irrefutable foundation for all states seeking 
to build nuclear weapons.1 This was the case at the dawn of the nuclear 
era, and it remains the case today. 
To be sure, nuclear espionage and theft constitute just one component 
of a long-established international practice: stealing military-related in-
dustrial secrets - a thriving practice that remains alive and well in today’s 
globalizing and interdependent world. In 2007, the South Korean Na-
tional Intelligence Service reported that over $100 billion in technology 
had been stolen and illegally exported in the previous three years. Much 
of the stolen technology found its way to China.2  The practice of stealing 
nuclear secrets has long been part of this tradition. The underworld of 
clandestine nuclear procurement began in the 1940s, with us and So-
viet spies scouring the globe to obtain the information, people, materials, 
and technology necessary to build the bomb. The espionage activities of 
Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs, and a team of Soviet spies working un-
der cover on the Manhattan Project significantly speeded up the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear programme.3  More recently, China is believed to have 
accelerated its nuclear weapons programme courtesy of stolen us plans 
and technology. Many believe that China’s systematic, state-directed pro-
gramme of industrial espionage is ongoing.4  In 1999, Congressional 
researchers declared that China’s next generation of nuclear weapons 
would almost certainly integrate stolen us design information.5  
Despite the international community’s best efforts to administer ex-
port control regimes to control the illicit spread of the most dangerous 
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25technologies, consumer and suppliers alike continue to find new ways 
of avoiding detection. Practices honed by spies of an earlier era con-
tinue today with national authorities, quasi-governmental organizations, 
front companies, wayward corporate entities, and well-placed individu-
als helping would-be proliferators acquire technologies and materials 
around the world. 
This paper investigates the nuclear black market of the modern era, 
focusing on the illicit procurement networks of four different states in 
their quest to build a nuclear weapon in circumvention of international 
export control regimes. While today’s illicit procurement networks, ex-
tending from states like Iran and North Korea, are not fundamentally 
that different from the illicit procurement network created by the Soviet 
Union in the 1940s, today’s increasingly interconnected world offers new 
avenues and opportunities for complex illicit procurement networks. If 
the world remains committed to controlling the spread of nuclear weap-
ons as called for under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, then it must 
keep pace with the efforts of today’s suppliers and consumers as they 
construct illicit procurement networks. The objective of this paper is to 
draw attention to four illicit procurement networks from the modern era, 
comparing factors in these cases as a way to illustrate their similarities 
and differences that, in turn, can offer some general yet instructive les-
sons. These lessons provide a guide to the international community, and 
can help it in taking the necessary steps to detect future illicit networks 
through the collection of intelligence, thus facilitating national-level and 




What constitutes a nuclear black market? Mark Fitzpatrick, a former 
US non-proliferation official defined it as: ‘the trade in nuclear-related 
technologies, components or materials that is pursued for non-peaceful 
purposes and most often by secretive means.’6  It might be more accurate 
to describe this phenomenon as a ‘grey’ market, since some transactions 
may not be explicitly illegal, but still may take advantage of loopholes in 
national export regulations.
How are black markets formed and how do they operate? In their 
paper on proliferation rings, Braun and Chyba focused on the exchange 
of nuclear weapons-related and missile technologies among several de-
veloping countries. The authors called these ‘second-tier proliferation 
networks,’ consisting of such countries such as Iran, Libya, Malaysia, 
26 Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, and others.7 The authors stated that ‘pro-
liferation ring members’ support one another either directly at the state-
to-state level or indirectly through once-removed private sector supplier 
networks. Their research found that ‘rings’ of clandestine exchanges of 
technologies sprang up between and among the network participants.8 
A prime example provided by the authors is that of North Korea’s barter 
with Pakistan for missile-for-enrichment technologies. They called this 
exchange a ‘benchmark event in the global proliferation enterprise.’ 
Alexander Montgomery borrowed from research on social network 
structures to explain that there are basically three procurement network 
structures: rings or circles, stars, and cliques. According to Montgomery, 
circles are formed with connections between each node; stars have a 
central hub that connects to each node; cliques are networks where all 
nodes are directly connected to each other. Montgomery contends that 
all networks so far have been star structures, with the state acting as 
the hub, and any future nuclear network will likely adopt the star struc-
ture in part because nuclear proliferation has greater tacit knowledge 
requirements.9 
In his research on procurement networks, Bruno Gruselle noted that 
the controlling factors that shape the appearance of networks remain 
the same worldwide, even if the individual situations of network actors 
vary.10  Gruselle concluded that state demand has always been the driving 
force for proliferation, but the structure of the networks designed to sat-
isfy the demand is new. According to Gruselle, network structures have 
been made possible by three factors: (1) increased trade flow and tools to 
manage trade have made it possible for networks to conceal themselves 
in ways that are difficult to monitor; (2) the fact that various goods used 
for wmd development are also used for civilian purposes makes it easier 
for networks to hide the true intent for purchases; (3) the appearance of 
suppliers that are capable and willing to transfer materials and technolo-
gies contributes to the development of networks.11  
The above literature focuses mainly on demand as the driving fac-
tor for the development of network structures. James Russell argued in 
2006 that distinctions between the supply and demand aspects of weap-
ons proliferation would become increasingly blurred in future prolifera-
tion networks.12  He posited that non-state actors would assume more 
important roles in illicit procurement networks, providing proliferation 
market ‘substructure’ to function in the supply and demand sides of the 
market.13  Looking at phenomena such as the Khan Network and other 
procurement networks, we surmise that multinational corporations, 
non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, and transna-
tional social movements all represent examples of ever more numerous 
27organizational structures that operate across borders and on a global 
scale, therefore requiring further scrutiny by the international commu-
nity. Non-state proliferation market substructures include at least one of 
three characteristics: (1) they deal in legitimate trade in dual-use items 
that can be diverted to develop wmd; (2) as front companies and sub-
sidiaries of state-run organizations, they can operate outside national 
borders and circumvent export controls; and (3) they service demand of 




In 1974, after India tested its ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ Pakistan as-
sembled a group under the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (paec) 
to build a nuclear weapon. Recognizing that it was deficient in various 
technologies, the paec established a multi-layered procurement network 
to acquire nuclear related equipment and technologies. It contracted with 
foreign companies to obtain facilities, equipment, and know-how, and 
used their embassies abroad as bases for procurement missions; cooper-
ated with allies to obtain goods; used front companies to procure items; 
used multiple intermediaries; falsified export control documents; and 
made use of personal connections to seek out and purchase essential nu-
clear materials. In what is now the most publicized case on nuclear net-
works, A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani national, was instrumental in developing 
an elaborate network of buyers and sellers that helped not only Pakistan 
develop its nuclear programme, but also Iran, Libya, and North Korea. 
He achieved all this while living and working in the Netherlands in the 
early 1970s.14  Pakistan employed various strategies to evade internation-
al detection and controls, including purchasing individual components 
such as centrifuge pre-forms rather than complete assemblies; hiding 
critical components on long lists of useless materials; paying exagger-
ated prices to entice suppliers to overlook export license requirements; 
buying samples and the means to reproduce them; purchasing raw ma-
terials and machines to refine them; establishing trans-shipment routes; 
cooperating with friendly countries such as China, Libya, and North 
Korea; and enlisting members of the Pakistani diaspora worldwide.15 
Pakistani buyers frequently traveled abroad to meet with relevant 
companies (or their representatives) to obtain goods, services, and 
knowledge necessary to build a nuclear weapons programme. These buy-
28 ers courted organizations that might have been politically sympathetic to 
helping Pakistan in its quest, or simply interested in selling goods to 
a willing buyer at mark-up prices. In early 1975, Sulfikar Ahmed Butt, 
thought to be the paec’s chief nuclear buyer, befriended Rudolf Ortmay-
er, a manager at the West German firm Nukleartechnik GmbH (ntg), 
and presented him with a comprehensive wish list of items necessary 
for paec’s programme.16 ntg produced various nuclear components, in-
cluding technology in nuclear medicine, heavy-ion research, heavy wa-
ter production, nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear contamination, and vac-
uum technology.17 Under Ortmayer, ntg provided Pakistan with much 
needed items and contacted other companies on behalf of the paec for 
goods it could not provide. In 1985, ntg sold and exported a tritium re-
covery facility to Pakistan, calling it a heavy water purifier on licensing 
paperwork to elude export control regulations. The paec also developed 
a close relationship with scientists at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Center (kfk), located in Karlsruhe, Germany. In the 1980s, ninety per 
cent of kfk was owned by the West German Government. While avoid-
ing the attention of the authorities, kfk’s scientists were therefore able 
to transfer items such as mass spectrometer components, train Pakistani 
scientists, and invite some Pakistani scientists to visit the kfk facilities. 
As kfk was a government sponsored facility, it did not operate under 
the same export constraints as other companies. Despite German for-
eign ministry officials passing on us intelligence reports alleging illegal 
transfers of materials to Pakistan, Economics Ministry officials allowed 
exports to continue.18  
Pakistan’s procurement efforts extended to North America. From 
1977 to 1980, a Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin, Abdul Aziz Khan, 
visited Pakistan to work with A.Q. Khan. In 1980, Abdul Aziz Khan 
returned to Canada, and with the help of two associates began obtaining 
high-frequency inverters - electrical components that are used in ura-
nium centrifuges (devices used to enrich uranium for either nuclear reac-
tor cores or nuclear weapons cores). Operating out of two small stores, 
Aziz Khan and his friends purchased the inverters, repackaged them, 
and made nine shipments to the Kahuta Research Laboratory (krl) in 
Pakistan. They were later caught and convicted for making illegal ex-
ports. In 1981, us officials seized a package of zirconium at Kennedy Air-
port that was to be shipped to Dr Sarfras Mir, a retired Pakistani army 
colonel, who operated the front company S. J. Enterprises. The package 
had been labeled as mountaineering equipment.19  
Since uncovering Libya and Iran’s nuclear activities, western intel-
ligence agencies have been busy disassembling the Khan international 
nuclear procurement network. Although headed by A. Q. Khan in Paki-
29stan, the network relied on intermediaries in Austria, Dubai, Germany, 
Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the us, the uk, and possibly other places. It was made up of 
Khan’s past schoolmates, colleagues, and contacts. Some examples in-
clude Gotthard Lerch, once a high level manager at Leybold-Heraeus and 
friend of Khan’s; Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir (bsa Tahir), owner of smb 
Computers and a contact made while Khan was maintaining the krl; 
Gerhard Wisser, friend of Lerch’s and supplier of South Africa’s nuclear 
programme; Johan Meyer, manager of Tradefin Engineering and contact 
of Wisser’s; and Hank Slebos, a school mate of Khan’s in the Netherlands. 
The loose connections in this network underscore the importance of so-
cial networks as a basis for developing and operating a procurement net-
work. Khan’s network was used to procure, manufacture, or otherwise 
supply needed items. Khan established trans-shipping points in Turkey 
and Dubai, and manufacturing operations in South Africa and Malaysia. 
Firms in Japan and Singapore also contributed high-tech equipment to 
the network.20  According to Grusselle, ‘The A. Q. Khan Company ap-
pears to have always operated on the principle of a direct initial contact 
between the network leader and his customers. Once contacts had been 
made and main principles had been defined, Khan appears to have left 
his main associates responsible for operational implementation.’21  
Iraq
After the 1981 bombing of its Osirak reactor, Iraq established a sophisti-
cated procurement network to obtain the technologies necessary for its 
nuclear programme. In the 1980s, the Ministry of Industry and Military 
Industrialization (mimi), coordinated with Iraq’s commercial, diplomat-
ic, and intelligence services to establish front companies, use intelligence 
services, use embassies, and find ways to evade the export controls of 
other nations. Their efforts mimicked many of the techniques success-
fully developed by Pakistan.
In the 1980s, Iraq used its embassy personnel to help it identify 
willing sellers of equipment needed for its programme. In one impor-
tant case, Ali Abdul Muttalib, commercial attaché at the Iraqi embassy 
in Bonn, Germany, identified companies that could be useful to fill item 
requests. He also learned how to elude European export controls by 
describing equipment in such a way that would facilitate approval of 
licenses.22  Muttalib also facilitated buying missions from Iraqi delega-
tions. In 1987, for instance, Khadhir Hamza lead a delegation to Germa-
ny to locate needed equipment such as highly enriched uranium (heu) 
processing equipment and high speed measuring equipment to help Iraq 
30 develop high explosive lenses. Muttalib identified relevant companies 
including Leybold and Degussa, and introduced Hamza to Werner Son-
ntag, a representative of the Neuero and Inwako companies. The Iraqis 
gave Sonntag a long list of explosive test equipment and the technologies 
necessary for designing a facility to conduct explosive testing. Hamza 
and Sonntaq are known to have had extensive contracts with Iraq.23  
Inwako provided other equipment, including ring magnets to stabilize 
centrifuge rotors and helped Britain’s Swift-Levick to transfer magnets 
to Iraq. Inwako helped Iraq upgrade its scud-b missile systems.24  
Iraq used experts in countries such as Germany to help them ob-
tain needed materials for their nuclear programme. For instance, Karl 
Heinz Schaab, ex-man Technologien ag employee helped to provide 
centrifuge rotors to Iraq. man was a principle consulting company to 
the urenco uranium enrichment consortium, supplying that compa-
ny with carbon-fiber rotors for its more advanced uranium centrifuges. 
Schaab left man New Technology because he felt that they did not pro-
mote him fairly. He subsequently established his own small firm. Dur-
ing that time he was often without projects and therefore took every 
opportunity to work, including taking on jobs that were beneath his 
ability with the rationale that he’d gain more appropriate contracts in 
the future. In the mid-1980s, Dietrich Hinze and Bruno Stemmler - also 
a former man employee who had dealings with the Iraqis in the past 
- introduced Schaab to their Iraqi contacts for possible work. Schaab 
and his colleagues may also have worked together on projects in Brazil. 
Schaab trusted and admired Stemmler and therefore did not question the 
Iraqis’ stated purpose of their requests. Although Schaab was technically 
adept as an engineer, he was not experienced as a businessman. This 
reportedly made him more susceptible to Iraqi influences. The Iraqis 
treated Schaab with the respect and kindness that he felt he deserved. 
On two occasions, Schaab and his colleagues made shipments to Iraq. 
The first occurred in 1989, when Schaab shipped a small number of ro-
tor samples. In 1990, Schaab shipped twenty complete rotors. Schaab 
manufactured the rotors himself using an S-glass fiber supplied by the 
Japanese firm Toray and a filament winding machine, then sent to a 
firm in Austria. Apparently both shipments went to the Austrian firm 
which then shipped the rotors on to Iraq.25 According to sources, Schaab 
was a centrifuge expert and therefore had the technical know-how to as-
sist the Iraqis to set-up a centrifuge programme for uranium enrichment. 
Schaab also sold classified man-blueprints of a sub-critical centrifuge for 
forty thousand dollars to the Iraqis, along with thirty-six carbon fiber 
rotors during a meeting in Kaufbeuren. The Iraqis may have exported 
the rotors through diplomatic channels to conceal their transport. In 
31total, Schaab sold the Iraqis equipment and items for the total amount of 
approximately one million dollars. He also provided technical assistance 
to the Iraqis, such as installing a prototype test-rotor in a Baghdad labo-
ratory.26 Iraqi agents often found companies such as Schaab’s that were 
small and needed infusions of capital for their operations.27 
As a part of its network Iraq established a series of front companies 
to procure items and disguise their final destination and end-use. mimi 
set-up the Al-Arabi Trading Company and Nassr General Establishment 
to procure materials for Iraq’s conventional and unconventional weapon 
programmes, and Iraq’s nuclear establishment directed other front com-
panies such as the Industrial Projects Company (ipc) to purchase com-
ponents for Iraq’s centrifuge programme.28  The Iraqis also used these 
companies to purchase or buy controlling stocks in other companies to 
procure needed items and other business benefits. For instance, in 1987, 
Al-Arabi secretly purchased a fifty per cent stake of the German Firm H 
+ H Metalform GmbH. 
Co-founder of H+H, Dietrich Hinze was an engineer who worked for 
over twenty years in the tool making and mechanical engineering firm 
Leifeld and Co. in Germany. In the early 1980s, Hinze decided to set up 
his own business, together with his partner Hütten, who was once the 
sales manager at Leifeld. Together, in 1983, they founded the company 
H+H Metalform. The name of the new firm, H+H, stood for Herstellung 
und Handel in German or ‘production and trade’ in English. One of the 
main activities of H+H was the production and sale of vertical-flow-form-
ing machines, developed by Mr. Hinze. Flow-forming machines have 
both military and civilian applications. They can be used to produce 
steel tubes for ammunition and missile casings, as well as centrifuge ro-
tors for uranium enrichment but can also be used to produce industrial 
gas-cylinders and pressure cookers. 
In April 1987 H+H was contacted by the London-based company, 
Meed International, which belonged to an industrial network responsible 
for procuring military equipment, especially in the field of rocket tech-
nology for Iraq. Meed’s parent company was the Nassr Establishment for 
Mechanical Industry Ltd., located in Taji, Iraq. During contract negotia-
tions between Hinze and the Nassr Establishment, it soon became clear 
that Nassr wanted to produce artillery with diameters of 122-262 mm. 
The Iraqis needed flow-forming equipment for this and other purposes 
although these were never openly stated. Hinze was in Baghdad several 
times to supervise the installation of his machines and other equipment. 
He gave further assistance in technical problems regarding the produc-
tion of flow forming parts that later turned out to be items for the Scud 
missile. Altogether, the contract was subsequently concluded for the sup-
32 ply of nine flow-forming machines (each worth between $1-2 million). 
To produce their machines, the young company H+H needed additional 
capital. The banks approached by Mr. Hinze refused to give credit be-
cause the company could not offer sufficient security. Therefore they had 
no option but to accept an offer from the Iraqis to acquire a fifty per cent 
stake in H+H. This is how another subsidiary of Nassr, Al-Arabien Co 
Ltd., came to have a share holding in H+H. From 1987 through 1990, 
H+H Metalform supplied machines tools and equipment for the produc-
tion of rockets and ballistic missiles worth altogether around twenty-
five million dollars. In nearly all cases, export permits were issued by 
Germany’s Federal Office for Trade and Industry (baw). Part of this is 
due to H+H declarations that the machines were to be for civilian pur-
poses, like producing gas-cylinders, hydraulic-cylinders, lamp-posts, etc. 
However, these were covers to escape suspicion and gain export licenses. 
Iraq’s contracts with H+H included provisions for machines, equipment, 
and technical assistance. In addition, H+H provided Iraq with contacts to 
other firms who cooperated because of their long-standing relationship 
with H+H Metalform.29 
Iraqi intelligence services also established front companies to pro-
cure needed items. Some of these companies operated subsidiaries in 
other countries such as Jordan to facilitate the procurement and ship-
ment to end-users in Iraq. For example, the Iraqi Al-Eman group organ-
ized material flows through Jordan to Iraq, often labeling the contents 
of packages and end-users in such a way as to quell suspicions of illegal 
activity. According to the Iraq Survey Group’s final report, the Sattam 
Hamid Farhan al-Gaaod company established the Al-Eman Commercial 
Investment group in the 1990s and Satam Hamid had a special relation-
ship with the Agricultural Supplies Committee of the Ministry of Agri-
culture (MoA). From 1990 to 2003, Al-Eman shipped approximately 
one container a month through Jordan to Iraq via the Iraqi Embassy 
in Jordan. For Instance, in 1995, Al-Eman purchased a kit of reagents 
worth five thousand dollars from the Swiss firm Elisa for an organiza-
tion named al-ibaa, a special unit in the Iraqi MoA. al-ibaa was 
connected to Saddam, had a special research facility and was granted 
an unlimited budget. al-ibaa was able to obtain any equipment and 
support within Iraq that it needed and paid cash for all its orders.30 A 
diagram of Iraq’s procurement network is described below.
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Source: Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and 
the Rise of Proliferation Networks – A Net Assessment (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).
34 Iran
Since the 1980s, Iran has acquired nuclear-related materials and equip-
ment, designs, and assistance from a multitude of entities in countries in-
cluding China, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Rus-
sia, Switzerland, and the United States. The type of equipment obtained 
ranges from high-strength aluminum and steel, electron beam welders, 
balancing machines, vacuum pumps, computer-numerically controlled 
(cnc) machine tools, and flow-forming machines, to whole centrifuges 
and uranium conversion plants.31  Iran developed its model for procure-
ment in a similar fashion to those of Pakistan and Iraq. Commonalities 
include the use of persons in national embassies to make contacts, use 
of front companies and falsified end-user certificates to conceal end us-
ers, and the use of middlemen to contact willing suppliers, to obtain the 
required equipment and assistance. 
In 1987, Iran became the Khan network’s second client after Paki-
stan when it purchased a set of centrifuge blueprints and sample pieces 
of obsolete equipment from the Pakistani programme. It also purchased 
a nuclear weapon design blueprint which was thought to be based on an 
early Chinese model, but may also have been a more modern Chinese 
design. Khan may have provided a number of other items to Iran, in-
cluding nuclear weapon designs and a number of studies including some 
on the manufacture of uranium hemispheres. In the late 1990s Dr Khan 
provided North Korean nuclear experts with up to twenty discarded cen-
trifuges, sets of drawings, technical data, and a quantity of uranium hex-
afluoride (uf6). All items are useful for uranium enrichment research.32 
Khan’s last known customer was Libya. Khan and his network provided 
a long list of items and information including: twenty pre-assembled L-1 
centrifuges and components for an additional two hundred L-1 centrifug-
es; ten thousand L-2 machines and supporting equipment, including feed 
stations, product and tails withdrawal stations, vacuum equipment, cas-
cade piping, drive systems, and other miscellaneous equipment. Khan’s 
procurement network helped to manufacture and ship the components 
and equipment from entities in different countries. In addition, the net-
work provided Libya with technical assistance and design information 
on a conversion and fuel fabrication laboratory (referred to as Project 
702); a post-irradiation examination facility, designed for the receipt 
and disassembly of pressurized water reactor (pwr) spent fuel assem-
blies (Project 307); a radiochemical separation laboratory, consisting of 
a pilot scale Purex reprocessing plant designed for processing approxi-
mately 1100 kg of uranium per year of pwr spent fuel and recovering 
35approximately 10 kg of plutonium per year (Project 701); and a high 
level liquid waste vitrification plant that is designed for solidifying high 
level waste from the reprocessing plant (Project 303). Lastly, the Khan 
network provided Libya with design information for the fabrication of a 
nuclear explosive device, including information related to high enriched 
uranium re-conversion, casting and machining, and the testing of nucle-
ar weapons components. Much of the sensitive information coming 
Source: author research
36 from the network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dis-
semination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge 
enrichment and, more disturbingly, information that relates to nuclear 
weapon design.33
Iran’s procurement network appears to be controlled by the top tiers 
of government. The President appoints the cabinet, called the Council of 
Ministers, and the appointees must be confirmed by the legislature, the 
Majlis. Included in the Council of Ministers are the Ministry of Defense 
and Armed Forces Logistics (modafl), the Ministry of Energy, and the 
Ministry of Education and Research. These ministries serve as three con-
duits for procurement and administration of Iran’s wmd programmes. 
The diagram of Iran’s procurement structure is above.
modafl controls both the Artesh, the regular military and the 
Pasdaran _ also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(irgc).34  The irgc initially had an independent command structure 
after its creation in 1979. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Iranian government sought to modernize and professionalize the irgc 
and the regular military under modafl.35  At this time, the industrial 
and procurement organizations of both militaries were combined into 
the Defense Industries Organization (dio), the organization which sup-
plies both modafl and the irgc. dio is staffed by, and linked to, both 
the Artesh and the irgc. However, most directors of io and the modafl 
were irgc officers.36  modafl, dio, and subsidiaries have been listed in 
unsc Resolution 1737, us State Department sanctions lists, and Japanese 
meti sanctions lists for involvement in the nuclear and ballistic missile 
programmes source.37  The irgc uses Iran’s Defense Industrial Organi-
zation (dio) and its subsidiaries, some universities, and the ‘bonyads’ 
(see below) to attempt to acquire dual-use nuclear technology in coun-
tries such as Japan and Germany. The irgc maintains links to each leg 
of this network. The dio is normally directed by an irgc commander, 
for example, former dio director and current Minister of Defense and 
Armed Forces Logistics (modafl) Brig. General Mostafa Muhammad 
Najjar.38 
Outside of formal state control, and believed to answer only to the 
Supreme Leader, is a network of ngos known as ‘bonyads.’ These organ-
izations possess an independent authority beyond the reach of elected 
officials and other parts of the government.39  They publish no accounts, 
are tax exempt, and have special relationships to state power.40  Opera-
tionally, bonyads are special cooperative corporations that are responsi-
ble for a large segment of the Iranian economy, and they manage groups 
of companies with offices within Iran and around the world. 
37Some bonyads have alleged links to proliferation activities, includ-
ing the Mostazafan va Janzaban Foundation (mjf), the Nur foundation, 
the Astan-e-Qods Rezavi Foundation (aqrf), and the Imam Reza Holy 
Shrine.41  Cases against mjf, aqrf, and Nur Foundation originate from 
the German Intelligence Service (bnd) and ncri, respectively. The mjf, 
aqrf, and the Nur foundation are staffed with former irgc command-
ers. Mohsen Rafiqdust, a founding member of the irgc and former its 
former commanding officer, was director of mjf from 1989-98 and di-
rector of Nur from 1999 to the present day.42  In 1997, the weekly Ger-
many magazine Stern reported that a bnd investigation was underway to 
determine if the mjf was a conduit to procure materials useful for wmd 
production. According to the report, at the time the mjf was headed by 
the former head of the irgcc, Mohamed Rafighdost. Stern quoted a Ger-
man Government report confirming that mjf had created ‘fake’ compa-
nies to act as intermediaries to purchase goods related to the production 
of wmd.43  According to the bnd report, ‘dio couriers carry parcels full 
of microelectronics components and files out of the office in Duesseldorf 
in the evening and take them to the Iranian Embassy in Bonn.’44  In 
2000, a bnd report noted that the mjf makes illegal purchases through 
dealers and dummy companies in Dubai and ships them back to Iran.45 
Noted examples are the Alborz, Aliaf P.P. Azar, Tizro Trading Company, 
Yusaf Universal Import-Export Est, and Company 209.46 mjf may also 
operate in the us According to a 2007 Wall Street Journal report, ‘a group 
calling itself the Mostazafan Foundation of New York took control of a 
Manhattan office tower built in the 1970s by the deposed Shah.’47  The 
group later changed its name to The New York Foundation and maintained 
majority control of the building.
The Imam Reza Holy Shrine also has links to Iran’s wmd programme, 
albeit only tangentially. The shrine’s custodian is Ayatollah Abbas Vaez 
Tabassi, cell mate to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei prior 
to the Iranian Revolution. Tabassi’s son, Nasser Vaez Tabassi owns and 
operates Al-Makasseb, a multimillion dollar company based in Dubai.48 
Al-Makasseb was financed by Bank Melli, Iran’s largest financial institu-
tion, which has 3500 branch offices worldwide.
Like Iraq, Iran invested in foreign companies to fulfill its procure-
ment needs. For instance, in 1987 Iran invested in the Rio Tinto-Zinc 
mining company in Namibia.49  In 1996, Iran may have purchased the 
German machine-tool manufacturer Sket Magdeburg.50  
As noted earlier, both the irgc and  Atomic Energy Organization 
of Iran have used various Iranian universities as procurement fronts for 
Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1991, the Sharif University of Technol-
ogy in Tehran ordered centrifuge components from the Austrian firm 
38 Tribacher.51 That same year, Sharif also ordered ring magnets from Thys-
sen, a German machining company and sought to purchase vacuum 
pumps from Leybold. Another German firm, Karl Shenck of Darmstadt 
transferred Sharif a balancing machine.52 In 1993, agie and Charmilles 
Technologies sold Sharif electronic discharge machinery that can be 
used to produce nuclear fuel production equipment and gas centrifuge 
components.53  In 2003, the Australian firm gbc Scientific Equipment 
attempted to deliver a mass spectrometer (used to evaluate the enrich-
ment of uranium) to Amir Kabir University of Technology. In 2002, 
gbc had exported a mass spectrometer to the Centre for Agriculture and 
Medicine at Karaj. The equipment was used to measure uranium isotope 
enrichment levels.54  
North Korea
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk) established its illicit 
nuclear procurement networks as far back as the 1970s, developing a 
system of using expatriates and agents traveling around the world to 
acquire the necessary items to support their nuclear programme. North 
Korea was also aided by its allies in Russia, China, and Pakistan in ob-
taining goods and services.
In the late 1980s, A. Q. Khan offered centrifuge technology to 
the North Koreans, with major shipments occurring in the late 1990s. 
Those shipments may have coincided with the provisions of the agreed 
framework which mandated the halting of any reprocessing activities.55 
In 1997, Khan may have also provided the North Koreans with the same 
shopping list that he did the Iranians in 1987. That list helped the North 
target willing companies and stay below the radar of foreign authorities. 
Between 1999 and 2000, Khan provided North Korean engineers with 
up to twenty P-1 centrifuges and technical advice on the operation of cen-
trifuges.56 Since the late 1990s North Korea has been working to develop 
its uranium enrichment programme. The North’s procurement agents 
used Khan’s list of nuclear suppliers to help them obtain related equip-
ment. For instance, the Japanese company Mitutoyo is known to have 
transferred goods to Scomi International, as part of an order from the 
Khan network, to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Mitutoyo is a privately-
owned company that makes three-dimensional precision measuring ma-
chines.57 These machines can be used to help produce the rotors needed 
for a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment programme. In each case 
of transfer, Mitutoyo is known to have eluded export controls by falsely 
stating that overseas subsidiaries were the final destination.58  In the case 
of transfers to Iran, the company sold the machines to a locally based 
39Iranian trading company, Seian trading company, which is thought to be 
an Iranian front company to help Iran purchase equipment for its own 
nuclear programme.59 
Source: author research
For many years, agents of the dprk tapped into Japan’s North Korean 
population and industrial base to obtain the materials they need for its 
wmd programmes.60  In 1946, North Korean scientists living in Japan 
established an association in the Kanto area of Japan. Over the years, the 
association underwent several changes and in 1985 it merged with other 
organizations to form the Kyako or Korean Association of Science and 
Technology (kast). According to some media reports, kast is under the 
direct control of the external relations division of the Korean Workers 
Party in Pyongyang.61 The group is comprised of approximately 1,200 
members, some of whom work in fields such as physics and engineer-
ing, and have periodically visited North Korea.62  kast operates twelve 
branches all over Japan and manages a number of Japanese corpora-
tions. These include the Daiei Machinery Corporation (later renamed 
the Diastar Corporation) and the Shinei Shouji Corporation. Members 
work in a number of other research institutes, national universities, and 
40 corporations that could be helpful in wmd development.63  Illicit equip-
ment transfers have been traced back to those companies. For instance, 
in 1993, Daiei arranged for the export of measurement equipment to 
North Korea. In 1994 Japanese authorities discovered that a kast re-
lated company had transferred a jet mill machine – equipment used to 
grind materials finely - to North Korea.64  Another organization, the 
Kim Man-Yu Science Foundation, established with the objective of assist-
ing North Korean scientists in Japan, may have helped Korean scientists 
living in Japan both to obtain goods and nuclear know-how and then 
send it back to North Korea.65  The structure of the dprk procurement 
network is described above. 
North Korea established and operated a viable logistical system be-
tween itself and Japan to transport items home without raising suspi-
cions. Specifically, the North Korean ferry, Man Gyong Bong, that runs 
between North Korea and Japan was used to ship items home. According 
to news reports, before the Taepo-Dong-1’s first test launch in 1997, mis-
sile components were regularly exported from Japan to North Korea.66 
In 2003, the Tokyo Vacuum Corporation, a vacuum pump maker, and 
an export agent, Nakano Corp., transported vacuum pumps to North 
Korea via a Taipei company.67 According to press reports, the pumps 
could be used in uranium enrichment processes. However, there seems 
to be some confusion regarding their specific use.68 In another example, 
between August 2006 and August 2007, the Taipei company, Hua Yueh 
International, made as many as fourteen shipments of Japanese dual-
use components (including stainless steel pipes, computer software and 
computer numerical controlled machine tools) to North Korea. The com-
pany reportedly mislabeled the point of destination as ‘China.’69  
For decades, North and South Korea have held scientific and educa-
tional exchanges in the hope that they would engender better relations 
between the two countries. These exchanges also facilitated transfers of 
goods and assistance. For instance, the Korea Mining and Development 
Corporation (komid) assisted North Korea in its missile proliferation 
efforts.70  According to a bbc report in 2004, the Horkos Corp. in Fuku-
yama mislabeled tools that can be modified to produce centrifuge rotors 
and sent them to South Korea. Investigators suspect that the ultimate 
destination of the tools was North Korea.71  
North Korea procurement agents are also known to be targeting 
European companies to fulfill its requirements. For instance, in 2002, 
North Korean experts made an effort to procure 22 metres of 6061-T6-
grade aluminum pipes from the Optonic GmbH in Germany.72  North 
Korea also imported 2600 aluminum tubes from Russia.73 In addition 
to targeting European companies, North Korean diplomats may have re-
41cruited South Korean intellectuals living in Germany for clandestine pro-
curement activities. In October 2003, South Korean sociologist Chong 
Ty-yul was arrested for engaging in an organized anti-government and 
anti-democratic movement in Germany since the 1970s.74  
Network Commonalities
In each of these cases there are some common procurement practices. 
Each network started out affiliated with and organized by the state, but 
in some cases they are semi-autonomous in nature. In each case the 
network used embassies located in industrial centers around the world 
as bases for making purchases and shipping materials home. They also 
created fronts such as phony companies, education institutions, and non-
profit organizations to conceal procurement activities, and they estab-
lished offshore logistics and financial centers to move acquired technolo-
gies and pay for them. 
In some cases, procurement network substructures have emerged 
as semi-independent bodies that may function as third tier supplier net-
works depending on their intentions and motivations. These third tier 
networks include quasi- or non-governmental organizations, military 
organizations, state-owned companies, and nonprofit or religious or-
ganizations. Again, Khan may have been the most flagrant example, but 
other examples may include the irgc and bonyads in Iran or even kast 
in Japan. Each was set up by the state with specific purposes and given 
functions that required that they establish a procurement network struc-
ture, with a high level of autonomy. These entities could help other coun-
tries or other allies develop wmds if it was to their advantage to do so. In 
the case of the irgc for instance, if it seemed advantageous for them to 
provide wmd to a non-state actor _ a terrorist or military group in Iraq, 
Lebanon, or elsewhere _ to defeat Iran’s enemies, then this could be 
achieved with or without the knowledge of the head of state, given their 
somewhat autonomous nature, and control of wmd facilities. 
Companies such as Mitutoyo may also provide products to groups 
that it knows are aiding suspected proliferators, but in this case, it may 
be to increase company’s profits.
New Nuclear Suppliers?
As nations have developed their procurement efforts and perfected the 
methods of evading export controls, some have emerged as future nu-
clear suppliers. A case in point is the revelation that North Korean enti-
42 ties have contracted with Syrian officials to help Syria build a nuclear 
programme. Although the details are not well known, there is evidence 
that North Korean engineers were building a nuclear reactor similar to 
the twenty to twenty-five megawatt thermal reactor in Al-Kibar outside 
of the city of Al-Tibnah.75  To support its contract with the Syrians, North 
Korea employed one of its own procurement agents to travel abroad and 
purchase needed items. According to a recent Washington Post report, 
western intelligence has been tracking the activities of the North Korean 
company, Namchongang Trading Group (ncg). According to the Post’s 
report, NCG employees have traveled to several European countries such 
as Germany to purchase an array of items including electric timers, steel 
pipes, vacuum pumps, transformers, and aluminum pipes cut to precise 
dimensions. These items were purchased and shipped to ncg’s branch 
office in Beijing, then sent on to the Al-Kibar site. According to David 
Albright, ‘because it’s a branch office in China, ncg can buy equipment 
from suppliers throughout the world, even in Europe and possibly the 
United States, particularly if the companies have subsidiaries in China.’76 
China is a nuclear-armed state, meaning some export regulations are dif-
ferent. Additionally, as Albright indicates, if items were being purchased 
in China, but by a branch office in China, then it may not attract the 
attention of the authorities. Like North Korea, China has good relations 
with Syria. 
This is not a new phenomenon. During the cold war, states in the 
western and eastern blocs benefited from the technological develop-
ments of their allies. Now that it is confirmed that North Korean entities 
have been assisting Syria, it is distressing to think that other countries 
could also receive North Korean assistance. Iran has similarly offered to 
help its allies (or potential allies) with nuclear technologies, and some 
countries that are just looking to join an expanding nuclear market, such 
as Brazil and Argentina, may also be future illicit conduits. Perhaps even 
more disconcerting is the whole set of substructures such as the irgc, 
kast, and the myriad front companies, that could, given sufficient mo-
tivation (be it financial or political) act on their own to supply would be 
proliferators.
Challenges for Intelligence and Detection 
Given that we know what items are necessary to build nuclear pro-
grammes, and we know the common methods that networks use to ac-
quire these items, what can be done to curtail the development of future 
networks? The underlying remedy to chronic illicit nuclear transactions 
43is developing more transparency and greater control over the export of 
nuclear-related and dual-use materials. More intelligence collection, in-
formation sharing, and policing are needed. By monitoring information 
sources and focusing on the common elements found among procure-
ment networks, we can detect sales (and attempted sales) of relevant 
items. More export-related information is needed. As intelligence agen-
cies and other government agencies collect information about possible 
illicit transactions, regulatory bodies and police organizations need to be 
given this information to help them stop these transactions. More collec-
tion and analysis of industry information, business transactions, dubious 
business enquiries, and suspicious bid offers is needed. And more shar-
ing of information is needed between nations and international bodies 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea). Within the 
iaea, the Trade and Technology Analysis unit (tta) is asking member 
states to provide information about enquiries for potential purchases of 
goods and services. tta hopes to get any information on communica-
tions to learn who is interested in purchases and what they are interested 
in acquiring. This information can help detect third party activity that 
can then be stopped. 
National agencies could also share information of suspicious foreign 
enquiries with industries who, in turn, could alert their constituents to 
illicit activities. More work needs to be done to make companies aware 
of illicit network activities, holding companies more responsible for en-
suring that their employees are not transferring nuclear related goods 
illicitly. David Albright called companies the first line of defense and 
perhaps the most important line of defense.77 Commercial entities need 
to be made more aware of the dangers of buyers attempting to buy their 
goods while concealing the end-use or purpose for the purchase.
Conclusion
As nations continue to develop nuclear programmes and established sup-
pliers look for ways to compete against others to increase profits, they 
will look for new methods to evade export controls and transfer goods 
under the radar. Clearly the most dangerous materials being trafficked 
today are those that are related to nuclear programmes. Although in 
the past the press had reported on illicit procurement activities, their 
significance was not realized until authorities acted to break up the Khan 
network.78  The proliferation activities of Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea illustrate the problem faced today by the international community: 
procurement networks are staying ahead of export controls by altering 
44 their tactics, learning new and more evasive techniques and finding 
ways to exploit legitimate trade practices to acquire sensitive materials. 
While control regimes may have successfully slowed the first and second 
tier of proliferation networks, there is actually a third tier of networks - a 
‘substructure’ that is comprised of a variety of semi-autonomous groups 
that can service the demand size of today’s nuclear black market.79  
The challenge for intelligence agencies, and international and na-
tional regulatory bodies, is to continue to investigate questionable ac-
tivities and to find new tools to interdict any transactions which may 
result. Looking for indicators such as frequent buying missions to in-
dustrial countries, suspicious contacts and organizations operating out 
of embassies, scientific exchanges and other doubtful alliances among 
allied nations, and nationals living overseas shipping materials to their 
home country, investigators can identify and analyze the existence of 
new and existing procurement networks. This information then needs to 
be shared with industries and companies that produce sensitive items to 
make them more aware of illicit procurement efforts and thereby enable 
them to ward off illicit attempts to buy their products. These and other 
more innovative measures are needed to help enable the international 
community to stifle nuclear procurement activities, thereby slowing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 
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